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Collapsible Corporations—Probems and Pitfalls 
by EGERTON W . DUNCAN 
Principal, Executive Office 
Presented before the Haskins & Sells Annual 
Tax Conference, Washington, D.C.—October 1962 
THE EVOLUTION of Code section 341, the present Collapsible Corpora-
tion statute, can best be described as the story of what happens 
when Congress does too thorough a job of closing a loophole. Sub-
sections (a) through (d) of the statute constitute the embodiment of 
provisions in three separate revenue acts—1950, 1951 and 1954— 
intended to forestall practices that seriously threatened the revenue. 
Subsection (e), which was added by the Revenue Act of 1958, repre-
sents the opposite—a strenuous attempt to mitigate penalties that 
turned out to be harsher than intended, without reopening the loop-
hole. Subsection (e) sets some sort of a record for verbosity and com-
plexity, and in sheer volume of printed pages outweighs the rest 
of the statute by more than two to one. Fortunately for me, Mr. 
Reinhardt has agreed to tackle subsection (e), and I might add that 
he is welcome to it. I can, therefore, limit myself to the less abstruse 
parts of the statute which deal with its basic loophole-closing aspects. 
LOOPHOLE-CLOSING PURPOSES OF STATUTE 
I realize most of you are familiar with the type of tax avoidance 
that section 341 was designed to correct and, therefore, I shall not 
dwell at any great length on the background that gave rise to the 
enactment of this statute. Suffice it to say the tax avoidance with 
which Congress was concerned was the conversion to capital gain, by 
means of a corporate liquidation or sale of stock, of what would other-
wise have been ordinary income in the form of rentals, compensation 
for personal services, or profits from sale of stock in trade. The 
principal penalty imposed by section 341 consists of a denial of long-
term capital gain treatment on liquidation of, or sale of stock in, a 
corporation formed or availed of for this type of tax avoidance. 
I am not here overly concerned with the application of section 341 
to corporations engaged in construction, real estate development, or 
motion picture production. All of us are at least aware of the pos-
sibility of having collapsible corporation sanctions imposed against 
such corporations and their shareholders. In fact the taxpayers them-
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selves may have had reason to entertain serious doubts about whether 
capital gain treatment would be appropriate at the time they organized 
such corporations or became shareholders thereof. I am more con-
cerned here with the possibility of section 341 being used as a trap 
to ensnare unwary stockholders in the event of liquidation, or sale 
of stock in, a more conventional corporation. I am concerned about 
this because of the prevalent misconception that section 341 applies 
only to specific types of businesses or to stockholders who lack purity 
of motive. On the contrary, the statute is broad enough to include 
corporations in practically every business category and provides no 
exception for any particular type or types of business or corporation. 
Of course by express provision shareholders owning 5 per cent or 
less of the outstanding stock are for the most part exempt from 
section 341 penalties. Therefore, the ordinary investor is reasonably 
well insulated and need not be concerned with collapsible status 
of the corporation. 
I wish I could say categorically that section 341 applies only to 
corporations engaged in real estate development, building construc-
tion, or motion picture production and that it does not apply to 
mercantile or manufacturing corporations. Unfortunately I can make 
no such general statement. 
MANUFACTURING AND M E R C A N T I L E CORPORATIONS 
It is conceivable that the collapsible-corporation penalties could 
apply to a mercantile or manufacturing company by reason of an 
increase in the value of its inventories. The problem would be most 
likely to occur with manufacturers' finished-goods inventories, the 
value of which is substantially in excess of cost of raw materials, 
direct labor, etc. The problem could also arise for retailers and whole-
salers using LIFO inventories where current costs are considerably 
higher than LIFO costs. Of course a distribution of LIFO inven-
tories would result in the realization of ordinary income to the corpora-
tion under section 311 (b) measured by the difference between LIFO 
and current costs. As a corporation is collapsible only by reason 
of failure to realize substantial income from collapsible assets, it may 
be that the problem in the case of a liquidation is merely academic. 
Nevertheless, where there is a sale of stock rather than a liquidation, 
the question is of something more than academic interest. Moreover, 
there will be other cases where the gain attributable to inventories 
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results from bargain purchases or a rise in market values. In any 
event there is nothing in section 341 that would expressly exempt a 
manufacturing or mercantile corporation from collapsible sanctions. 
The Regulations insofar as they may deal with this subject are 
something less than explicit. They indicate that a corporation will not 
be considered collapsible if the amount of inventories (both in quantity 
and in value) is not in excess of the amount that is normal, provided 
the corporation has a substantial prior history including the use 
of such inventories. Presumably this means that at least in most 
cases the collapsible corporation penalties will not apply so long as 
the corporation does not acquire or accumulate inventory for the 
purposes of the proscribed tax avoidance. 
As far as I can determine the Service has had only one occasion 
to express its views concerning collapsible classification of a mercantile 
corporation. This was in a ruling issued in 1956 (Rev. Rul. 56-244, 
1956-1 CB 176) relating to a corporation engaged in the sale of oil 
drilling equipment. The corporation was liquidated after about ten 
years of operation, and the business was thereafter continued on a 
smaller scale by a partnership composed of former stockholders. The 
Internal Revenue Service found that the liquidation was compelled 
by curtailment of business activities caused by market saturation. In 
holding that the corporation was not collapsible the Service empha-
sized the fact that the inventory at the date of liquidation was normal 
for the volume of sales and no greater than the average inventory 
over the previous several years. It is not clear whether the ruling was 
predicated on this fact alone or on the fact that liquidation was com-
pelled by factors unforeseeable at the time the corporation was 
organized. 
The question of the application of section 341 to a mercantile 
corporation was also raised in a California District Court case, 
(Levenson v. US.), one of the few cases, if not the only one, dealing 
with a corporation engaged in something other than real estate 
development, construction, or motion picture production. The cor-
poration in this case had entered into a contract to purchase 4,000 
house trailers at a price that, as it developed, was something of a 
bargain. The shareholders disposed of their stock in this corporation 
at a time when the corporation had sold somewhat less than 50 per 
cent of the trailers. However, the trailers were made available to the 
corporation by its vendor only as and when they were released by the 
occupants, and on the date the stock was sold the corporation had 
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only about 100 of these in inventory. The Court held that the gain 
was largely attributable, not to property manufactured, constructed, 
produced, or purchased, but to a non-collapsible asset, the purchase 
contract. You will recall that under one of the limitations in section 
341 a shareholder will not be deprived of capital gain unless more than 
70 per cent of the gain is attributable to collapsible assets. Although 
collapsible stigma was avoided, the case does bear witness to the fact 
that a mercantile corporation can be subject to collapsible penalties 
by reason of its inventories. 
E F F E C T OF LIFO INVENTORIES 
It is most difficult to predict at this time whether the Commis-
sioner will attempt to apply section 341 where the gain on sale of stock 
is due in large measure to low LIFO base inventories. To do so he 
would have to overcome the argument almost certain to be raised by 
the taxpayer that a substantial part of the income from the property 
has been realized by reason of previous sales. This argument would 
negate collapsibility because the statute by its express terms does not 
apply unless the sale or liquidation occurs prior to the time the cor-
poration has realized substantial income from the collapsible assets. 
To overcome this argument the Commissioner would have to contend 
that each item of inventory is a separate property. This contention in 
turn could be countered by carrying the contention to its logical 
conclusion. If each inventory item is a separate property, hasn't the 
property been held for more than three years, assuming of course 
that the LIFO base goes back this far? If so, then the shareholders 
could avoid ordinary income treatment under the exception dealing 
with corporations that hold the collapsible asset for more than three 
years. This line of reasoning would seem at least to be consistent with 
the literal meaning of last-in, first-out. 
CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 
OR TIMBER RAISING 
I wish I could also categorically state that section 341 does not 
apply to corporations engaged in agriculture, the operation of fruit 
orchards, growing of timber, and the like. Unfortunately again I can 
provide no such assurance. The statute can apply to any corporation 
engaged in manufacture, construction, or production of property. Neither 
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the statute nor the regulations attempt to define these terms. The 
Service did rule, however, that the drilling and equipment of oil wells 
on unproved leases constituted construction or production of property 
(Rev. Rul. 57-346, 1957-1 CB 236). This interpretation was later con-
firmed by a District Court (Honaker Drilling Inc. v. Koehler, 7 AFTR 
2d 416 (DC Kan. 1961)). Neither the Service nor the District Court 
seemed concerned with the fact that the statute does not use the 
word development, a term invariably referred to in connection with 
exploitation of mineral properties. The question has yet to be answered 
about whether the raising of crops constitutes the production of 
property. Probably, the drafters of the Collapsible Corporation statute 
were thinking of motion pictures when they used the term production 
as the terms manufacture and construction could hardly be appropriate 
to motion pictures. Nevertheless, taxpayers and tax advisers can ill 
afford to ignore one of the dictionary definitions of the word produce 
which reads as follows: To bring forth as a mature product or growth ... 
as, the earth produces grass, trees produce fruit. 
Thus, literally interpreted, section 341 could apply to a corpora-
tion engaged in farming, ranching, raising timber, etc. Moreover, on 
the sale of a farm the entire gain, or at least more than 70 per cent, 
may very well be attributable to unharvested crops, a collapsible asset, 
and, therefore, the possible application of section 341 should not be 
overlooked. I might add that if section 341 can properly be interpreted 
as applying to a farm corporation, we have an instance of the con-
gressional left hand not knowing what the congressional right is doing. 
This will be apparent when it is recalled that Congress went out of its 
way in the 1951 Act to permit capital gain treatment for sales of 
unharvested crops sold with the land by adding the 1939 Code 
equivalent of Section 1231 (b) (4). The 1951 Act, as you will recall, 
was the same Act that tightened up the collapsible-corporation loop-
hole. 
LIMITATIONS ON STOCKHOLDER PENALTIES 
Before concluding this part of the discussion I should like to make 
brief mention of the three limitations on the application of section 341. 
I refer, of course, to the 70 per cent rule, the three-year rule, and 
the 5 per cent stock-ownership rule, to all three of which I have 
previously referred. Under the 70 per cent rule, section 341 penalties 
can be avoided by showing that at least 30 per cent of the gain on 
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sale or liquidation is attributable to non-collapsible assets. Thus, 
where the value of corporate goodwill, trademarks or tradenames, and 
possibly copyrights and patents, is substantial, it may be that the 
70 per cent rule provides a convenient mechanical criterion for proving 
the shareholder's right to capital gain. As to copyrights and patents 
this presupposes that these items are neither manufactured nor produced 
within the meaning of the statute, an assumption that cannot safely 
be made at this time. 
It is most important to note that these three limitations merely 
relieve the individual shareholders in certain cases from ordinary 
income treatment on liquidation or sale of their stock. Unlike the 
exceptions provided in subsection (e) to be discussed by Mr. Rein-
hardt, these limitations do not affect the corporation's collapsible 
status. The corporation may still be collapsible even though, because 
of the limitations, none of the stockholders will be denied capital 
gain benefits. This is important because the corporation, being col-
lapsible, will under section 337 be denied the privilege of making 
tax-free liquidating sales during a 12-month period. Presumably, 
however, to gain the corporation by reason of liquidating sales can 
be avoided under the Cumberland Public Service case if the post-liquida-
tion sales are actually made by the shareholders. 
AVOIDANCE OF COLLAPSIBLE STATUS 
I should like to point out that a corporation might avoid col-
lapsible status simply by realizing the income to be derived from 
the collapsible assets. Moreover, collapsibility does not deprive the 
corporation of long-term capital gain benefits on sale of the collapsible 
assets if these are in fact capital assets. Thus, in some cases it might 
be advisable for the corporation to dispose of the collapsible assets 
prior to liquidation. It may be that the effect of two capital gains taxes 
—to the corporation on sale of the assets and again to the stock-
holder—may be less burdensome than one tax at ordinary rates to the 
stockholder on liquidation or sale of the stock. 
It may be possible to avoid both the collapsibility problem and 
the problem of two capital gains taxes by means of a Sub-Chapter S 
election. In this connection it is important to note that a Sub-
Chapter S Corporation is not by that reason alone exempt from 
collapsible-corporation classification. Nor is there anything in the 
Code that would deprive a collapsible corporation of the privilege of 
249 
making a Sub-Chapter S election, provided, of course, that it otherwise 
meets the requirements of Sub-Chapter S. The sale of a collapsible 
Sub-Chapter S Corporation's stock or the liquidation of such a corpora-
tion may result in ordinary income the same as for a conventional 
corporation. Therefore, in order to avail themselves of capital gain, 
shareholders must make it a point to have the corporation sell the col-
lapsible asset. It is apparent that lack of planning in this area 
can be costly. 
It has been suggested that a potentially collapsible corporation 
whose collapsible assets are also capital assets, should prepare for the 
worst by disposing of its assets in connection with a plan of liquidation 
under Section 337. The reasoning goes something like this: If the 
corporation is successful in contesting collapsible stigma nothing has 
been lost, and the corporation has had the benefit of tax-free liquidat-
ing sales. On the other hand, if the corporation loses the argument 
and it is held to be collapsible, the worse that can happen is that it 
will have to pay a tax at capital gain rates on sale of its assets. 
However, as the corporation has now realized a substantial part of 
the income to be derived from the collapsible assets, capital gain will 
not be denied the shareholders. We have no less an authority than 
the Internal Revenue Service itself, in the form of a published ruling, 
for this suggested method of avoiding collapsible status (Rev. Rul. 
58-241, 1958-1 CB 179). 
One final possibility for avoiding collapsible-corporation stigma 
is suggested by a provision in the Regulations to the effect that the 
corporation will not be considered collapsible if the sale or liquidation 
is attributable solely to circumstances that arose after manufacture, 
construction, etc. The Regulations are quick to add, however, that 
this exception does not apply to circumstances that could reasonably 
be anticipated at the time of manufacture, construction, etc. In a series 
of recent decisions the courts have shown a willingness to rely on 
this provision of the Regulations as a means of saving deserving tax-
payers from collapsible-corporation sanctions. In most of these cases, 
the unanticipated circumstance that compelled the sale was the ill 
health of a major stockholder. See Maxwell Temkin, 35 TC 906 (1961); 
Elliott v. U.S., 9 AFTR 2d 1418 (DC Ore. 1962) ; Charles J. Riley, 
35 TC 848 (1961). Despite the generosity of the courts in this area, 
I should not like to go on record as recommending a heart attack as 
a means of avoiding collapsible-corporation penalties. 
At one time it was thought that collapsible status could be avoided 
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by having the corporation realize prior to liquidation or sale of the 
stock a substantial part of the income to be derived from the col-
lapsible asset. In those days it was believed that the only problem 
was to determine what percentage constituted a substantial amount. 
Unfortunately, however, the Commissioner, with some court support, 
has construed the statute to mean that the unrealised gain must not be 
substantial. Thus assuming that 33 per cent is substantial, as one 
court has held, the Commissioner would insist that at least 67 per 
cent of the gain must have been realized if collapsible status is to 
be avoided (Comm. v. James B. Kelley, 8 AFTR 2d 5232, 293 F. 2d 904 
(CA-5 1961)). 
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